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ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DIMENSIONS
BRUCE E. FEIN*
Preservation of the nation's democracy depends in large measure
on public access to information on government practices or poli-
cies. Enlightened public debate and intelligent voting require the
same access. As James Madison observed, "[a] popular
[g]overnment, without popular information, or the means of ac-
quiring it, is but a [p]rologue to a [flarce or a tragedy; or, perhaps
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: [a]nd a people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives."1 The Supreme Court relied in part
on Madison's views of the Bill of Rights in holding that the first
amendment requires that the public has a right of access to crimi-
nal trials.2
Madison, however, also recognized that, in limited circum-
stances, secrecy could be justified to attain ends superior to a com-
pletely informed public. As a delegate to the Constitutional Con-
vention, Madison supported making its deliberations confidential,3
and thereafter, reportedly maintained that publicity would have
scuttled the effort to achieve a consensus for adopting the Consti-
tution.4 In fact, two United States Constitution provisions clearly
endorse government secrecy. The first directs the publication of a
journal of each house of Congress, except "such parts as may in
[the Congress'] [j]udgment require [s]ecrecy."5 The second pro-
vides that "a regular [s]tatement and [a]ccount of the [r]eceipts
and [e]xpenditures of all public [m]oney shall be published from
* Senior Vice-President, Gray and Company, Washington, D.C. B.A., 1969, University of
California at Berkeley; LL.B., 1972, Harvard Law School.
1. 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (Letter to W.T. Barry,
August 4, 1822).
-2. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1980).
3. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 15-17 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).
4. See supra note 3 at 478-79 (Journal of Jared Sparks, April 19, 1830).
5. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
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time to time."6 The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit has determined that the phrase "from time to
time" was intended to authorize secret expenditures for sensitive
military or foreign policy endeavors. 7
Although the Constitution recognizes a limited need for congres-
sional secrecy, confidentiality may be equally vital to ensure that
the executive branch can perform its duties. Safeguarding the na-
tion's survival or supporting urgent foreign policy or national se-
curity goals may require the President to withhold classified infor-
mation from the public or Congress. This executive branch secrecy
is not inherently at war with the ethos of the Constitution. The
constitutional preamble gives national defense equal status with
"the blessings of liberty."8 Justice Jackson recognized this when he
warned against interpreting the Constitution as a suicide pact.'
Chief Justice Hughes stated the principle even more explicitly:
"Self-preservation is the first law of national life and the Constitu-
tion itself provides the necessary powers in order to defend and
preserve the Constitution."10
To hold national security interests invariably subservient to the
first amendment's devotion to publicity of government affairs is
senseless. As President Lincoln asked in addressing his unilateral
suspension of the habeas corpus writ during the Civil War,
are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government
itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a case,
would not the official oath be broken, if the government should
be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single
law, would tend to preserve it?""
Lincoln answered his rhetorical questions with a resounding "no"
when he ignored Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's federal circuit
court decree which held the suspension of habeas corpus to be un-
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
7. See Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 154-60 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
8. U.S. CONST. preamble.
9. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
10. 42 ABA REPORTS 232 (1917).
11. 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 430 (R. Basler ed. 1953) (message to
Congress in special session, July 4, 1861) (emphasis in original).
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constitutional. 2 Lincoln anticipated Chief Justice Hughes' recogni-
tion a half-century later that our nation is endowed with a fighting
Constitution.13
This Article explores the President's constitutional and statu-
tory powers to prevent the disclosure of classified information to
the public, to litigants, and to Congress, notwithstanding counter-
vailing values of the first amendment and other constitutional pro-
visions. The Article examines judicial and nonjudicial checks that
prevent the Chief Executive from abusing his authority to classify
or withhold information. It determines that federal statutes and
case law generally display proper deference to the President's
broad classification and secrecy powers. Contrary to a court of ap-
peals decision, however, the Article concludes that disputes be-
tween Congress and the President over access to classified informa-
tion should be held nonjusticiable political questions.
I. THE CURRENT SCHEME OF CLASSIFICATION
Several statutes and executive orders provide the procedure for
executive branch classification of government information. By ex-
ecutive order, President Reagan established a comprehensive
scheme for classifying and withholding national security informa-
tion.' 4 The Order defines "national security" as the national de-
fense or foreign relations of the United States, 5 and provides three
levels of classification for information. The Classification Order de-
fines "top secret" information as information, "the unauthorized
disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause excep-
tionally grave damage to the national security."16 "Secret" infor-
mation describes information "the unauthorized disclosure of
which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the
national security".' 7 Finally, the order defines "confidential" infor-
mation as information "the unauthorized disclosure of which rea-
sonably could be expected to cause damage to the national secur-
12. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
13. See ABA REPORTS, supra note 10, at 248.
14. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983).
15. Id. at 178 (§ 6.1(e)).
16. Id. at 167 (§ 1.1(a)(1)) (emphasis added).
17. Id. (§ 1.1(a)(2)) (emphasis added).
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ity."s In exercising their authority to classify material, the order
instructs designated officials to consider several categories of infor-
mation as candidates for classification:
military plans, weapons, or operations; the vulnerabilities or ca-
pabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to
the national security; foreign government information; intelli-
gence activities . .. , or intelligence sources or methods; foreign
relations or foreign activities of the United States; scientific,
technological or economic matters relating to the national secur-
ity; United States Government programs for safeguarding nu-
clear materials or facilities; cryptology; a confidential source;
and other categories of information that are related to the na-
tional security and that require protection against unauthorized
disclosure as determined by the President.19
The Order sets out affirmative guidelines for selecting informa-
tion to be classified. The Order enumerates improper purposes and
subjects of classification to prevent government officials from em-
ploying their authority "in order to conceal violations of law, ineffi-
ciency, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a per-
son, organization, or agency; to restrain competition; or to prevent
or delay the release of information that does not require protection
in the interest of national security."20 In addition, "[b]asic scien-
tific research information not clearly related to the national secur-
ity may not be classified. 2 1 Moreover, under the executive order
guidelines, officials must declassify information as soon as national
security considerations permit.22
The Order also addresses disclosure of classified information.
Generally, classified information may be disclosed only to execu-
tive branch officials whose trustworthiness has been determined by
an agency head or designated official and whose access is essential
to furthering a legitimate government purpose.2 3 Classified infor-
mation may be disseminated outside the executive branch only
18. Id. (Q 1.1(a)(3)) (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 163-69 (Q 1.3(a)(1)-(10)) (subsection designations omitted).
20. Id. at 170 (§ 1.6(a)).
21. Id. (Q 1.6(b)). That injunction has proved to be exceptionally vexing as applied to
cryptology and nuclear research.
22. Id. at 171 (§ 3.1(a)).
23. Id. at 174 (§ 4.1(a)).
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under conditions that ensure the same degree of confidentiality
protection as that afforded within the executive branch.24
Finally, the Order sets out sanctions for violations of its provi-
sions. Sanctions may be imposed on officers or employees of the
United States, federal contractors, licensees, or grantees, for inten-
tional violations or, in one case, for negligent violations of any pro-
vision of the classification order.25 The Order specifically singles
out for sanctions intentional misclassifications of information and
intentional or negligent disclosure of classified information to un-
authorized persons.26
The Atomic Energy Act of 195427 complements the President's
classification scheme. Its fundamental provision instructs the exec-
utive branch to protect the secrecy of "Restricted Data" unless dis-
closure does not create an unreasonable risk to the common de-
fense and security of the United States. 2 Restricted Data includes
all data concerning "(1) design, manufacture, or utilization of
atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or
(3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy
... .,"29 The Act prohibits an individual who has "reason to be-
lieve [restricted] data will be utilized to injure the United States or
to secure an advantage to any foreign nation" from communicat-
ing, transmitting, or disclosing such data to any person.30
The Department of Defense Authorization Act, 198431 also sup-
plements the President's Classification Order and, thus, promotes
national security objectives. Section 1217 of this Act empowers the
Secretary of Defense to withhold from the public any Department
of Defense technical data with military or space application that
may not be exported lawfully outside the United States without an
approval, authorization, or license under the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979, or the Arms Export Control Act.32
24. Id. (Q 4.1(c)).
25. Id. at 177 (§ 5.4(b)).
26. Id. (§ 5.4(b)(1)-(2)).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982).
28. Id. § 2161.
29. Id. § 2 014 (y).
30. Id. § 2274.
31. Pub. L. No. 98-94, 97 Stat. 614 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C., 10 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
32. Id. § 1217, 97 Stat. 690 (1983).
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II. GOVERNMENT INTERESTS FOSTERED BY SECRECY
The comprehensive scheme created by the President's executive
order and by statutory provisions demonstrates governmental rec-
ognition that important national interests may be served and ad-
vanced when the executive branch withholds certain information
from the public. These national interests concern, in a fundamen-
tal sense, our national survival. First, protecting the confidentiality
of properly classified information bolsters the nation's capacity to
defeat foreign aggression and, thus, to preserve the Constitution.
Disclosure of classified information may aid the military strength
of the nation's enemies, or may undermine the fighting capability
of our armed forces. Revealing blueprints for constructing the na-
tion's cruise missiles deployed in Europe or the Trident II subma-
rine missiles, for example, would aid Soviet military power and
technological prowess. Ceaseless efforts by the Soviet Union to buy
or steal this type of information testify to its military value." Even
during peacetime, disclosure of information about the security
safeguards of plants manufacturing nuclear weapons would imperil
the nation's security. Such information might be exploited by ter-
rorists and used to attack or destroy the plant or its inventory of
weapons. The United States, thus, possesses a compelling interest
in maintaining the secrecy of weapons information.
The United States, furthermore, has a compelling interest in
withholding other types of military information. During war, dis-
closure of the location or plans of the nation's armed forces would
impair chances of military victory. An announcement that experts
had successfully deciphered encrypted enemy messages would ne-
gate any advantage gained by the discovery, because the enemy
would change their plans and code. These examples illustrate the
government's need for military secrecy.
The national need for secrecy does not exist only in the areas of
weapons, troops, and tactics. To deter military aggression and
avoid endangerment of American lives, the President must be em-
33. Since 1980, the Justice Department has prosecuted thirteen cases of espionage on be-
half of Soviet or eastern bloc countries. No prosecutions have been dropped because of con-
cerns that national security information might be disclosed. Telephone interview with
Thomas E. Marum, Deputy Chief, Internal Security Section, Criminal Division, U.S. De-
partment of Justice (January 10, 1984).
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powered to maintain the secrecy of classified information or nego-
tiations concerning foreign relations, treaties, and executive agree-
ments. Express or tacit agreements between the United States and
foreign countries would be scuttled or their terms adversely
skewed if either the advice given the President or the content of
negotiating deliberations between American and foreign officials
were publicly disclosed.34 First, publicity would chill candid discus-
sions between the President and his advisors, and between the ne-
gotiating parties. The United States Supreme Court recognized
this danger when it observed, "[h]uman experience teaches that
those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well
temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own
interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process."3 5
Second, disclosure of the negotiating tactics or positions of any
party might affect national interests adversely. Publicity revealing
the negotiating tactics of the United States would undermine the
possibility of an agreement advantageous to the nation. Equally, if
the negotiating posture of a , oreign government were disclosed,
then embarrassment or a loss of domestic political support for that
incumbent foreign government might foreclose any agreement with
the United States. Disclosure, furthermore, might circumscribe
possibilities for compromise by making it politically unacceptable
for a government to yield from a publicly known bargaining posi-
tion. Many of these considerations retain their force even after ne-
gotiations have concluded. President Washington explained the
reasons for this when he refused the House of Representatives' re-
quest for papers prepared in anticipation of treaty negotiations
with England:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their
success must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to
a conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or
eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contem-
plated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a perni-
cious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate in-
34. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
35. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
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convenience, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other
powers.36
In fact, the imperative of secrecy supplied a prime reason for
granting the President, and not Congress, the authority to negoti-
ate with foreign governments.3 7
The need for secrecy is not refuted by experience showing that
disclosure of classified information has not invariably occasioned
immediate foreign policy setbacks or caused imminent military
danger. Military or foreign policy developments result from a
broad array of forces and events. Publicity of classified information
might contribute to a chain of events that several years thereafter
endangers the nation's independence or gravely wounds our foreign
policy goals. Safeguarding against such eventualities is a para-
mount government interest under the Constitution.38
III. CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES IMPAIRED BY SECRECY
To preserve the Constitution and, thus, the nation's indepen-
dence, secrecy of classified information may be an urgent necessity.
Such secrecy, however, lessens government accountability to the
people by reducing public knowledge of government activities and
by impeding informed public appraisal of government officials and
must be balanced against other constitutional goals. Justice Black
maintained in New York Times Co. v. United States,3 9 that "para-
mount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to pre-
vent any part of the government from deceiving the people and
sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and for-
eign shot and shell."'40 Justice Black further insisted that "[t]he
guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of in-
formed representative government provides no real security for our
Republic." '41
The first amendment fosters several vital constitutional values
36. 1 J.D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-
1902, at 194-95 (1905).
37. See THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (J. Jay).
38. See ABA REPORTS, supra note 10.
39. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 717.
41. Id. at 719.
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which governmental secrecy may impair. The first amendment
supports the protection and encouragement of informed public col-
loquy "to the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peace-
ful means. '42 Enlightened public discussion or criticism of govern-
ment policies enables the electorate to form intelligent opinions
whether particular public officials should stay in office or whether
particular government practices should continue. When the public
is denied access to classified information, however, trenchant ap-
praisal by the electorate of the nation's defense and foreign poli-
cies may be hindered.
Arguably, norms of self-government are mocked when classified
information about foreign negotiations or weapons potentially de-
cisive in either precipitating or forestalling war is concealed from
the public. Voters pay additional taxes and hazard life and limb if
war eventuates because of government action. This argument im-
plies that the public should be privy to all government delibera-
tions or information that could be pivotal in matters of war or
peace. Additionally, it suggests that public disclosure of classified
information may enhance the quality of government decisionmak-
ing. Justice Douglas asserted that "[s]ecrecy in government is fun-
damentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. '4 3
For instance, President John F Kennedy's 1961 ill-starred Bay of
Pigs assault against Castro's Cuba may have been a miscalculation
that could have been avoided by public disclosure of classified in-
formation. Prior to the venture, Kennedy successfully invoked na-
tional security concerns to convince The New York Times to delete
certain information about the invasion in a Tad Szultz story After
the military fiasco, Kennedy told editors of The Times: "If you
had printed more about the operation, you would have saved us
from a colossal mistake."'44 Arguments and examples such as these
may suggest that governmental secrecy can seriously impair impor-
tant constitutional goals.
These questions raised by executive branch classification and
42. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
43. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 724 (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. Marder, Bay of Pigs Invasion was no secret to many, Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 1965, at
All, col. 4.
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withholding of national security information are answerable. First,
the public has no real need for particular items of classified infor-
mation in order to evaluate government performance. Vast quanti-
ties of nonclassified information concerning a President's foreign
or defense policies are available to the electorate. Because of the
availability of this data, even without access to classified informa-
tion, a voter can make an intelligent assessment of the President's
national security programs. Furthermore, voters are concerned pri-
marily with whether a President's national security policies have
been successful; the particular items of classified information em-
ployed in achieving success or in suffering defeats are, at best, of
secondary interest. The electorate generally knows, without access
to classified information, whether the nation is at war, or has
strengthened its alliances, or has improved its international
posture.
With the information available, the public not only can evaluate
foreign policies, but also can make its preferences known. An in-
cumbent President virtually may be ousted from office if the pub-
lic believes his foreign policies have failed. President Lyndon John-
son's decision in March of 1968 to renounce any re-election
aspirations in light of the albatross of the Vietnam War illustrates
the formidable power of public opinion in matters of national se-
curity. Denying the public access to classified information thus
works no meaningful impairment of the people's power to vindi-
cate their own national defense or foreign policy preferences
through the electoral process.
Government decisionmaking might, in limited circumstances, be
improved by public disclosure of classified information. Such a
benefit, however, seems outweighed by the harm publicity would
cause to many well-conceived government negotiations or national
security endeavors. The Manhattan Project and Ultrasecret, for
example, provided substantial national security benefits that de-
pended on secrecy.4 5
In addition, the likelihood that publicity of government delibera-
tions and consequent public input will improve the quality of deci-
45. The Manhattan Project was the secret endeavor of the United States to develop an
atomic bomb. Ultrasecret was the Allies' capability, unknown to the Nazis, to decipher en-
crypted messages during World War II. See F.W. WINTERsOTHAM, THE ULTRASECRET (1974).
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sions or agreements is insubstantial. Members of the public ordina-
rily lack the time or comprehensive knowledge needed to make a
productive contribution to national security decisionmaking by the
government.
Government secrecy, thus, is not inevitably incompatible with
constitutional values. Our Constitution was the child of secret de-
liberations. It has been lauded by Gladstone, nonetheless, as "the
most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain
and purpose of man. ' 48 The longevity of our Constitution and its
influence on the constitutions adopted in other nations further tes-
tify to its greatness. Secrecy of government deliberations or negoti-
ations thus is compatible with sound and far-sighted decision-
making.
IV. ACCESS BY CONGRESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Congress possesses a stronger need for access to classified infor-
mation than does the public. It may need this information to suc-
cessfully perform its constitutional duties. In addition, Congress
has procedural mechanisms that reduce the risk that members of
Congress will disclose classified information to the public.
Article I of the Constitution grants Congress legislative power
over a broad spectrum of national security matters.4 For example,
Congress authorizes the development and production of weapons
systems, and determines the size and compensation of the armed
forces.48 It possesses authority to declare war, to enact laws against
international terrorism, and to shape foreign policy through eco-
nomic or military aid or trade laws.4 9 The Senate addresses addi-
tional national security issues in considering whether to ratify trea-
ties, or whether to confirm a President's nomination of an official
who previously participated in national security decisionmaking in
government. 50 When Congress exercises its oversight duty to pre-
vent inefficiency or maladministration in the Defense Department,
the State Department, the National Security Agency, the Central
46. Gladstone, Kin Beyond the Sea, 127 NORTH AMA,& RaV. 179, 185 (Sept.-Oct. 1878).
47. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I.
48. See id. § 8, cl. 13.
49. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, 12 and 13.
50. See U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cL. 3 and 4.
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Intelligence Agency, or other executive agencies, it also may need
to examine national security matters.
Congressional access to classified information thus will foster en-
lightened and efficacious discharge of Congress' constitutional re-
sponsibilities over foreign policy or national defense. Furthermore,
congressional access can be circumscribed to avoid the risk of fur-
ther publicity of classified information. Hearings involving classi-
fied information can be held in closed executive sessions; classified
documents can be made available for examination by members of
Congress or their staffs only in executive branch offices; disclosure
of classified documents can be made only to select committees or
select members; classified documents can be held in secure rooms
and safes in congressional offices for perusal there without notetak-
ing; debates on the floor of the House or Senate concerning na-
tional security information can be held in secret; or classified infor-
mation may be transmitted to congressional committees only with
pledges of secrecy."
In summary, congressional endeavors to extract classified infor-
mation from the executive branch in furtherance of legislative du-
ties are justified constitutionally. The justification strengthens if
Congress accedes to procedural restrictions on access to classified
information that curtail the hazards of public disclosure.
Several factors, however, render congressional need for classified
information on national security imperative. Enlightened congres-
51. For a discussion of measures Congress may take to retain secrecy, see generally
United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 386-87 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (involving the ability of the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce to maintain the confidentiality of FBI wiretaps for asserted national se-
curity purposes). See also supra note 5 (regarding the constitutional basis for allowing por-
tions of the journals of each House of Congress to be kept secret); Senate Rule XXVI(5)(b);
House of Representatives Rule XI(5)(2) (executive sessions); Senate Rule XXVI(10)(a);
House Rule XI(2)(e)(2) (committee records to be kept only in committee offices); Senate
Rule XXI; House Rule XXIX (secret sessions).
A secrecy agreement between the executive branch and Congress, however, would proba-
bly be constitutionally unenforceable if a member of Congress decided to break the agree-
ment through disclosure of classified information on the floor of Congress or during a ses-
sion of a congressional committee. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615-16 (1972)
(finding that a legislator's reading of classified material into the public record is protected
by the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1); see also Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (holding that the Senate Subcommittee on
Internal Security's issuance of a subpoena duces tecum falls within the protection of the
speech or debate clause and is therefore immune from judicial interference).
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sional decisions about national security legislation or about execu-
tive maladministration can ordinarily be made without access to
classified information. As the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit explained in Senate Select Com-
mittee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, congres-
sional judgments normally "depend more on the predicted conse-
quences of proposed legislative actions and their political
acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events." 5
The executive branch, moreover, is entrusted with independent
responsibility for the formulation and execution of national secur-
ity policy. Disclosure of classified information to Congress may ob-
struct achievement of these executive duties for two reasons. First,
experience teaches that initial disclosures to Congress, despite pro-
cedural safeguards, frequently result in public dissemination of
classified materials through knowing or unwitting "leaks. '5 3 Dis-
closure to Congress, even without subsequent leaks, may chill full
and candid discussions of national security matters within the ex-
ecutive branch, or may inhibit negotiations or exchanges of infor-
mation with foreign officials. These consequences flow from a re-
luctance to display intellectual boldness or imagination if even
tentative or exploratory views are to be revealed to a separate
branch of government frequently at odds with the executive," and
a recognition by executive and foreign officials that disclosure to
Congress carries an appreciable risk of further disclosure to the
public.5
In conclusion, an examination of the respective constitutional
52. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (comparing the tasks of Congress and a grand jury).
53. A Senate staff official associated with the Senate Intelligence Committee observed
that classified information leaked into the public domain during the confirmation process of
Richard Burt, nominated by President Reagan to Assistant Secretary of State, and during
debate over CIA involvement in mining of Nicaraguan harbors. Interview with anonymous
staff official, Senate Intelligence Committee (December 1984). Herb Romerstein, a former
professional staff member of the House Intelligence Committee, remarked that when sharp
political divisions over the nation's policies in Central America emerged in recent years, the
number of leaks of classified information concerning that region multiplied. Interview with
Herb Romerstein (December 1984). See also I CRABB & P. HOLT, INVrrATION TO STRUGGLE
CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT & FOREIGN POLICY 152 (1980).
54. Cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705; New York Times, 403 U.S. at 727-30 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
55. See supra note 52.
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powers and interests of Congress and the Executive yields no cate-
gorical answer to whether the Congress should be constitutionally
entitled to obtain classified information from the Executive.
V. NONJUDICIAL SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE OF CLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY
A President could misuse his classification powers and withhold
information from Congress or from the public when disclosure
would not damage the national security. Several nonjudicial safe-
guards, however, militate against such misuse. These safeguards
help to preserve the constitutional values fostered by access to in-
formation and allow the benefits obtained from the ability to prop-
erly classify information to continue.
Experience demonstrates a substantial probability exists that
"leaks" from the executive branch would reveal patterns of im-
proper classification of information." First, Congress may infor-
mally investigate such misclassification. Following such revelations,
Congress could retaliate against the President by refusing to enact
legislation or to appropriate funds he has requested for national
security or for other purposes, by refusing to confirm nominees for
national security positions in the executive branch, by refusing to
ratify treaties, or, in extreme circumstances, by initiating impeach-
ment proceedings. Congress could pursue these retaliatory mea-
sures, moreover, upon mere suspicion of executive abuse of classifi-
cation authority, without confirmatory executive branch leaks. One
commentator observed:
It is obvious that in a large majority of cases it is greatly to the
advantage of the executive to cooperate with Congress, and in a
large majority of cases it does so. Congressional control over ap-
propriations and legislation is an excellent guarantee that the
executive will not lightly reject a congressional request for infor-
mation, for it is well aware that such a rejection increases the
chance of getting either no legislation or undesired legislation.57
56. The Reagan Administration's consternation over the frequency of leaks may yield new
legislation to stiffen penalties for government officials who disclose secrets to the press.
Wash. Post, Dec. 2, 1984, at A3, col. 1.
57. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting Bishop, The Executive's
Right to Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477, 486 n.3 (1957)).
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Second, the public may limit improper misclassification of infor-
mation. Unwarranted secrecy may impair chances for vindication
of the President's initiatives or for reelection. Third, the Presi-
dent's successor could inform Congress or the public of a predeces-
sor's unjustified classification of information. Finally, the Presiden-
tial Records Act of 1978 requires the maintenance, preservation,
and public disclosure of a broad array of presidential records." A
President's abuse of the power to classify probably would be re-
vealed under the Act after that President left office.5 9
VI. APPRAISAL OF STATUTES AND CASE LAW
The foregoing national security and constitutional considerations
provide the background for appraising the prevailing legal norms
governing access to or publicity of classified information. Analysis
of these norms is sharpened by separating the legal rules into five
categories: rights of the public or the press, rights of criminal de-
fendants, rights of civil litigants, rights of former government em-
ployees, and rights of Congress. Examination of these areas shows
that federal statutes and case law generally have recognized the
President's need for secrecy.
A. Rights of the Public or the Press
Generally, neither the public nor the media enjoy any constitu-
tional right of access to information or records generated or con-
trolled by the government, whether classified or not. This principle
may be seen in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,60 a case involving non-
classified government information. In Houchins, a broadcaster de-
58. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (1982).
59. Upon the conclusion of a President's term of office, the Archivist of the United States
has an affirmative duty to make presidential records available to the public as quickly as
possible. See 44 U.S.C. § 2203(f)(1) (1982). However, an outgoing president may specify
that certain documents shall not be made publicly available for a period of up to twelve
years. See id. § 2204. During this period, incumbent Presidents and either House of Con-
gress are permitted access to records containing information that is needed for the conduct
of their business and otherwise is unavailable. See id. § 2205(2)(B)-(c). These presidential
records also are available via subpoena for any civil or criminal investigation. See id.
§ 2205(2)(A). Thus, members of the public, the Congress in furtherance of its investigative
responsibilities, and subsequent Presidents in pursuit of their law enforcement functions
would all be in a position to uncover misclassifications.
60. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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manded access to a county jail to interview inmates and take pic-
tures there as a part of a story on prison conditions.6 Such access,
the broadcaster urged, was essential to enlightened public debate
over jail conditions. The first amendment, he maintained, creates a
right of access to government-controlled sources of information in
order to foster an informed electorate and to safeguard against
government wrongdoing or maladministration. 2
By a four to three vote, the Supreme Court rejected the broad-
caster's first amendment interpretation. Writing for a plurality of
three, Chief Justice Burger conceded that conditions in penal insti-
tutions are of great public importance, and that "with greater in-
formation, the public can more intelligently form opinions about
prison conditions."63 The Chief Justice denied, however, that the
first amendment commands that government facilities be opened
or that government information be disclosed simply because public
understanding of government would be incrementally advanced.6 4
The Constitution is not a Freedom of Information Act, the Chief
Justice concluded, and it permits legislative bodies or executive of-
ficials to fashion public access policies regarding government infor-
mation according to their respective visions of the public interest. 5
The Court has recognized only one exception to the "no access"
rule of Houchins. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,66 a
seven-to-one majority held the first amendment to require the
public and press be allowed to attend criminal trials, absent an
overriding interest in closing the trial, supported by specific find-
ings of the trial court. An Anglo-American history of open criminal
trials and the contribution openness makes to public understand-
ing of and confidence in the administration of justice provided the
intellectual pillars for the Richmond Newspapers decree.6 7 Unlike
61. Id. at 3-4.
62. See id. at 7-8.
63. Id. at 8.
64. See id. at 11 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972): "The First Amend-
ment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally."; and citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974):
"The media has no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that
afforded the general public.").
65. See id. at 12-16.
66. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
67. See generally id.
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criminal trials with a history of openness, classified information in-
variably has been earmarked by secrecy. Accordingly, the reason-
ing of Richmond Newspapers does not extend to the Houchins
norm and thus does not create a public or press right of access to
classified information.
While the courts generally have held that the public has no con-
stitutional right of access to government controlled information
without constitutional compulsion, Congress has established a nar-
row statutory right of public access to classified information when
the decision to classify was improper. Under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act,6" agency records generally must be disclosed to the
public on request. Agency records that are "properly classified
pursuant to ...Executive order"6 9 are exempt from mandatory
FOIA disclosure. Pertinent legislative history evinces an intent
that courts display substantial deference to the classification deci-
sions of the executive.7 0 Judicial examination of classified informa-
tion must be ex parte and in camera when a person seeks CIA
records; and the substantive (in contrast to the procedural) propri-
ety of the classification, to the fullest extent practicable, rests on
sworn written submissions of the parties.7 1 Rarely has the judiciary
compelled the government to reveal classified information.72
68. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-552b (1982).
69. Id. § 552(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
70. See S. CON. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6285, 6290:
[T]he conferees recognize that the Executive departments responsible for na-
tional defense and foreign policy matters have unique insight into what ad-
verse affects [sic] might occur as a result of public disclosure of a particular
classified record. Accordingly, the conferees expect that federal courts, in mak-
ing de novo determinations in section 552(b)(1) cases under the Freedom of
Information laws, will accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit con-
cerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record.
71. See Central Intelligence Agency Information Act, Pub. L. No. 98-477 § 701(f)(1)-(2),
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2209.
72. But see Peterzell v. Department of State, C.A. 82-2853 (D.D.C. October 16, 1984) (slip
op.), appeal docketed, No. 84-5805 (D.C. Cir. November 16, 1984); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 578 F.
Supp. 704 (D.D.C. 1983), appeal docketed, Nos. 84-5611, 84-5632 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Abbots v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 3 G.D.S. § 83.257 (1984). This paper does not examine
whether the federal judiciary should be entrusted with authority to review the substantive
correctness of classification decisions. The availability of judicial review may cause disclos-
ure of classified information for two reasons. An agency may decline to submit affidavits
explaining why requested records were classified because the explanation would reveal ex-
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While the public and press have only limited rights to procure
government information, if the press obtains classified information,
whether innocently or through wrongdoing, then the first amend-
ment establishes a qualified right to publish. In New York Times
Co. v. United States,73 the "Pentagon Papers" case, the govern-
ment sought to enjoin The New York Times and The Washington
Post from publishing a classified study styled "History of U.S. De-
cision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy. 174 The classified docu-
ments had been purloined from the government and the newspa-
pers received them with knowledge of the prior wrongdoing.7 5 No
statute, however, authorized the injunctive suits. The United
States claimed, instead, that the government's power to obtain re-
lief rested on the President's constitutional powers over national
security.7 6 By a six-to-three vote, the Supreme Court repudiated
the government's injunctive strategy."
All members of the majority authored concurring opinions. Jus-
tice Stewart's opinion, joined by Justice White, expounded the piv-
otal rationale for the decision. The Executive, Stewart asserted, is
endowed constitutionally with "enormous power" over national de-
fense and international relations, largely unchecked by the courts
or by Congress. 8 Absent government checks, informed public opin-
ion nurtured by a free press is the only effective restraint on the
Executive's national security policies.79 Thus, the press must vindi-
cate the basic purpose of the first amendment by informing the
public about the national security practices of the Executive.8
On the other hand, Justice Stewart acknowledged, secrecy is in-
dispensable to attain foreign policy or national defense goals:
[I]t is elementary that the successful conduct of international
ceptionally important classified information that might inadvertently or otherwise leak from
the court files. In addition, agency employees processing FOIA requests may unwittingly
release records entitled to classification because of insufficient knowledge. The most expert
high level agency officials ordinarily are not assigned to an FOIA assembly line.
73. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. See generally id. at 714-63.
77. Id. at 714.
78. Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 728.
80. See id.
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diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national defense
require both confidentiality and secrecy. Other nations can
hardly deal with this Nation in an atmosphere. of mutual trust
unless they can be assured that their confidences will be kept.
And within our own executive departments, the development of
considered and intelligent international policies would be impos-
sible if those charged with their formulation could not commu-
nicate with each other freely, frankly, and in confidence. In the
area of basic national defense the frequent need for absolute se-
crecy is, of course, self-evident.81
Justice Stewart extrapolated several conclusions from these ob-
servations. First, the executive branch possesses an unshared duty
and power to protect the confidentiality necessary to achieve its
national security responsibilities. 8 2 Second, Congress may assist the
Chief Executive by enacting civil or criminal penalties for disclos-
ure of classified materials, and the courts would have the responsi-
bility to decide the applicability and constitutionality of any laws
so enacted.8 3 Justice Stewart concluded that, in the absence of con-
gressional action, the President is entitled to an injunction prohib-
iting publication of classified information only by proving that dis-
closure would "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
damage to our Nation or its people. '8 4 Because that convincing
showing of harm was not forthcoming, Justice Stewart voted
against the government's request for an injunction.
The New York Times ruling left open the question of whether
newspapers enjoy a first amendment shield against criminal prose-
cution, civil damages, or penalties for publishing classified infor-
mation whose disclosure ineluctably would cause direct, immedi-
ate, and irreparable harm to the national security. 5
In United States v. Progressive, Inc.,86 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Wisconsin properly recog-
nized the narrow scope of the first amendment right of the press to
publish classified materials established in New York Times. The
81. Id.
82. See id. at 729.
83. Id. at 730.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 740 (White, J., concurring).
86. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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case stemmed from the successful efforts of a private researcher to
collate and synthesize information available in the public domain
describing a method of manufacturing and assembling a hydrogen
bomb.87 Relying on the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,88 the United
States sought to enjoin publication of the information. The district
court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that publication
would precipitate immediate, direct and irreparable harm to the
nation."'
Disclosure of the hydrogen bomb information, the district court
found, could accelerate the time needed by nonnuclear countries to
construct nuclear weapons.90 Moreover, the court reasoned, public
knowledge of the technical details of hydrogen bomb construction
is unnecessary to informed debate on the dangers of nuclear
proliferation."' In addition, the court asserted that publication of
the hydrogen bomb information arguably would flout a federal
statute.2 Section 2274 of the Atomic Energy Act proscribes the
disclosure of "restricted data" with reason to believe such data will
be exploited to injure the United States or to secure an advantage
to a foreign nation.9 3 The Act defines restricted data to include
data concerning the design or manufacture of atomic weapons.9 4
Thus, the court observed, the government's case for an injunction
was stronger than in New York Times because its request was rein-
forced by a federal statute.9 5
The Progressive court noted that in Near v. Minnesota,96 the
Supreme Court declared that injunctions against publication of
troop movements in time of war would not violate the first amend-
ment.9 In contemporary times, the court in Progressive asserted,
87. See id. at 993.
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982).
89. 467 F. Supp. at 999-1000. The court concluded that publication of the article would
likely violate the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, but went on to state that the case fell within
the narrow area, involving national security, in which prior restraint on publication is appro-
priate. Id. at 1000.
90. See id. at 994.
91. Id. at 996.
92. See id. at 994.
93. See supra note 30.
94. See supra note 29.
95. See 467 F. Supp. at 994.
96. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
97. Id. at 716.
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the replacement of foot soldiers by machinery and bombs placed
the country on a permanent war footing.9" A nuclear war can be
commenced instantly. Thus, the district court maintained, because
the government made a strong showing of direct, immediate, and
irreparable harm, and because suppressing technical data showing
how to construct a nuclear bomb would not obstruct the defen-
dants' quest to stimulate public knowledge and debate about nu-
clear armaments, enjoining publication of the technical data was
justified under the rationale of Near v. Minnesota.99
To summarize, case law and the Freedom of Information Act es-
tablish several propositions. Neither the public nor the press en-
joys a first amendment or statutory right to properly classified in-
formation. The public may obtain improperly classified
information held as agency records, however, through FOIA litiga-
tion, but courts may find impropriety in classification only in nar-
row circumstances. Further, if the press acquires possession of clas-
sified information, an injunction against further disclosure is
available only if the United States demonstrates that publication
would engender direct, immediate, and irreparable harm to the na-
tional security. An injunction could be justified on a lesser showing
of harm if publication would violate a federal statute. In addition,
the more insignificant the contribution the classified information
would make to informed public opinion and dialogue on national
security matters, the more readily an injunction will issue.
The Department of Defense recently has initiated unprece-
dented measures to further the principle "that the U.S. news me-
dia cover U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible
consistent with mission security and the safety of U.S. forces."100
These measures, designed to enhance public understanding and
public availability of information regarding military operations,
lessen the public's need for access to classified information to for-
mulate intelligent opinions regarding the nation's military
endeavors.
98. See 467 F. Supp. at 996.
99. Id.
100. See Statement of the Secretary of Defense releasing the final report of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Media-Military Relations Panel (Sidle Panel), No. 450-84 (Au-
gust 23, 1984).
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B. Rights of Criminal Defendants
Federal criminal defendants possess limited rights to examine or
to disclose classified information pertinent to establish a defense.
These rights, however, create no genuine threats to the govern-
ment's national security interests because the government can
withhold or suppress classified information by terminating a
prosecution.'10
Statutory provisions generally establish the rights of the defen-
dant and government in this context. Under the Classified Infor-
mation Procedures Act,102 the United States may seek a protective
order enjoining a criminal defendant from disclosing any classified
information revealed to him by the government. 10 3 Moreover, the
trial court
may authorize the United States to delete specified items of
classified information from documents to be made available to
the defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to substitute a summary of the Information
for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement ad-
mitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend
to prove. 0 4
A defendant must provide timely notice to the United States
whenever he anticipates disclosing classified information in con-
101. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (holding that recordings from
electronic surveillance must be turned over to defendants so that they can determine if any
illegally obtained information was used to convict them). The Court stated that if the gov-
ernment did not want to disclose the information it could decide to dismiss the case. Id. at
181, 184). See also Classified Information Procedures Act, § 6(f), 18 U.S.C. app. at 549
(1982):
Whenever the court determines pursuant to subsection (a) that classified infor-
mation may be disclosed in connection with a trial or pretrial proceeding, the
court shall, unless the interests of fairness do not so require, order the United
States to provide the defendant with the information it expects to use to rebut
the classified information .... If the United States fails to comply with its
obligations under this subsection, the court may exclude any evidence not
made the subject of a required disclosure and may prohibit the examination by
the United States of any witness with respect to such information.
Id. at 550-51.
102. 18 U.S.C. app. at 549-54 (1982).
103. Id. § 3, at 549.
104. Id. § 4.
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nection with any pretrial or trial proceeding.10 5 The United States
is entitled to an in camera hearing to obtain court rulings on the
use, relevance, or admissibility of the classified information.10 6 If
the court authorizes the disclosure of classified information, then
the United States may move to substitute either a statement ad-
mitting facts that the information would tend to prove, or a sum-
mary of the classified information. 10 7 The court must grant the mo-
tion if the requested substitution would not substantially detract
from the defendant's ability to mount a defense. 08 If the court de-
nies the motion and the Attorney General files an affidavit explain-
ing how disclosure of the pertinent classified information would
cause identifiable damage to the national security, then the court
must dismiss the prosecution and enjoin the defendant from dis-
closing the classified information.10 9 In lieu of dismissal, if the in-
terests of justice dictate, the trial court may dismiss only specified
counts of the indictment or criminal information, may make find-
ings against the United States on issues relating to the suppressed
classified information, or may strike or preclude all or part of the
testimony of a witness. 10
Another statute, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,"' re-
quires the government, in either criminal or civil proceedings, to
inform any target of electronic surveillance initiated for national
security purposes that it anticipates that it will use information
derived from the surveillance against him. 12 The target is entitled
to suppression of the information if it was unlawfully acquired or if
the surveillance deviated from an order of authorization or ap-
proval." 3 The United States may obtain an in camera, ex parte
suppression hearing if the Attorney General files an affidavit with
an appropriate court certifying that either disclosure of the chal-
lenged information or an adversary hearing would harm the na-
105. Id. § 5(a).
106. See id. § 6(a), at 550.
107. Id. § 6(c)(1).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 6(e)(1)-(2).
110. Id. § 6(e)(2).
111. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982).
112. See id. § 1806(c).
113. See id. § 1806(e).
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tional security.114 In ruling on a suppression motion, the court may
disclose to the target, under appropriate security procedures and
protective orders, materials related to the electronic surveillance
only when necessary for an accurate determination of its legality. 1" 5
In addition to statutory provisions, the Supreme Court has ex-
amined a criminal defendant's right of access to classified informa-
tion. To safeguard constitutional guarantees of privacy, the Su-
preme Court has ruled, in general, that evidence seized in violation
of a criminal defendant's fourth amendment rights, without good
faith justification, must be suppressed in criminal proceedings."'
To buttress a claim that evidence is tainted by a fourth amend-
ment violation, a defendant may review materials derived from un-
justified unconstitutional conduct, whether or not national security
information would be disclosed. 1 7 The trial court, where appropri-
ate, should prohibit the defendant and his counsel from unwar-
ranted disclosure of the materials subject to inspection." 8 To avoid
disclosure of national security information to the defendant, the
government may dismiss the prosecution.1 9
Criminal defendants, therefore, may insist on limited access to
or disclosure of classified information when necessary to marshal a
defense. These access and disclosure rights accord with concepts of
fairness and do not endanger the government's paramount interest
in national security. The government's interest can be protected by
dismissal of the prosecution or less drastic concessions by the gov-
ernment in a criminal case. Thus, in the area of criminal prosecu-
tions the defendant's need for information and the government's
need for confidentiality have been balanced properly.
C. Rights of Civil Litigants
In contrast to criminal defendants, plaintiffs suing the United
States enjoy no right of access to classified information pertinent
to the litigation. In United States v. Reynolds, 20 a Federal Tort
114. Id. § 1806(f).
115. Id.
116. See generally United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
117. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 181 (1969).
118. Id. at 185.
119. Id. at 181, 184.
120. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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Claims Act suit, plaintiffs sought discovery of an Air Force investi-
gation report of an aircraft accident and of statements of crew sur-
vivors. The United States resisted discovery on the ground that
disclosure would hamper national security seriously. 2' In a unani-
mous decision, the Supreme Court elaborated on the government
privilege for state secrets.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Vinson asserted that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure entitled the United States to
withhold disclosure of "privileged" information and that military
or state secrets are cloaked with privilege. 22 To determine whether
the government has properly invoked such privilege, Vinson de-
clared, the trial judge must determine from all the circumstances
that clearly, revelation of the evidence will expose military matters
that, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. 23
The judge should try to make this determination without an in
camera examination of the privileged materials. 24 The Court rec-
ognized that the greater the plaintiff's need for the material, the
more scrupulous the trial court's scrutiny of the privilege claim
should be.' 25 The Court ultimately concluded that if the govern-
ment establishes its privilege claim, no matter how great the plain-
tiff's need, then the government may withhold the national secur-
ity information without suffering any litigation sanction. 2 6
In Totten v. United States,27 the administrator of a decedent's
estate sought compensation for clandestine services performed by
the decedent under contract during the Civil War. 28 Denying the
claim, the Supreme Court reasoned that both the government and
the decedent must have intended to conceal the existence of the
contract:
This condition of the engagement was implied from the nature
of the employment, and is implied in all secret employments of
the government in time of war, or upon matters affecting our
121. Id. at 3-5.
122. Id. at 6-7.
123. Id. at 10.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 11.
126. See id. at 11-12.
127. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
128. Id. at 105-06.
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foreign relations, where a disclosure of the service might com-
promise or embarrass our government in its public duties, or en-
danger the person or injure the character of the agent.129
Accordingly, the Court explained, the secrecy obligation inherent
in the decedent's contract precluded any lawsuit for its perform-
ance: "The publicity produced by an action would itself be a
breach of a contract of that kind, and thus defeat a recovery."' 30
The Totten and Reynolds decisions establish the principle that
contract or tort claimants against the United States have no con-
stitutional right to obtain or to disclose military secrets or classi-
fied information to prove their claims.
The harshness of the rule was illustrated in Halkin v. Helms.'
In that case, twenty-seven individuals and organizations sued sev-
eral government agencies and private international record carriers
alleging unconstitutional interceptions of their international wire,
cable and telephone communications. 3 2 The Secretary of Defense
submitted an open affidavit stating that admitting or denying the
interceptions, in and of itself, would reveal important military and
state secrets involving the capabilities of the National Security
Agency to collect and analyze foreign intelligence. 33 Ex parte affi-
davits and testimony at in camera hearings reinforced this asser-
tion.13 4 Bowing to the Secretary's expertise, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
state secrets privilege entitled the government to refuse any re-
sponse to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, even if that refusal
resulted in concealment of unconstitutional actions.' 35 Dismissal of
the claims, thus, was mandated unless evidence, unprotected by
129. Id. at 106.
130. Id. at 107.
131. 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
132. Id. at 3.
133. See id. at 4-5.
134. See id. at 5.
135. See id. at 9. The court stated that the standard of review for claims of state secrets
privilege is a narrow one. "Courts should accord the 'utmost deference' to executive asser-
tions of privilege upon grounds of military and diplomatic secrets." Id. (citing United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). "The court need only be satisfied that there is a reason-
able danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the in-
terest of national security, should not be divulged." Id. (citing United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)).
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the absolute state secrets privilege, could prove the claims.13
The question of whether Congress by statute can compel access
to or disclosure of classified information in civil litigation is still
open. Under the Inventions Secrecy Act, 137 the United States may
prohibit publication or disclosure of any invention submitted for
patenting if necessary to prevent detriment to the national secur-
ity.1 38 Moreover, if such a determination is made, the grant of a
patent must be withheld for such period as the national interest
requires. 39 The inventor, however, may sue the government for
just compensation for damages resulting from any secrecy order is-
sued under the Act.140 If the just compensation litigation would
disclose military secrets, then the district court may order dismis-
sal."" Alternatively, the court may conduct the trial in camera, and
order disclosure of otherwise privileged "state secrets," but only if
no substantial risk of publicity exists beyond the closed court-
room. 42 Congress has not required open courtrooms in litigation
initiated pursuant to the Inventions Secrecy Act.143
In litigation between private parties, classified information may
be pertinent either to prove a claim or to establish a defense. An
assertion of the government's state secrets privilege must be
136. See id. at 8-11.
137. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-183 (1982).
138. See id. § 181.
139. See id. An order that an invention shall be kept secret and the grant of a patent
withheld is effective for up to one year. At the end of this time, the order can be renewed by
the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks if notified by the head of the government
agency who requested the initial order that the national interest continues to require the
invention to be kept secret. Id.
140. Id. § 183. In addition to the inventor's ability to bring suit in the United States
Court of Claims or in a United States District Court, the statute permits the inventor to
apply for damages to the agency or department that caused the invention to be kept secret,
and authorizes the head of that agency or department to enter into a settlement agreement
with the inventor. Id.
141. See generally Halpern v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), rev'd on
other grounds, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958) (inventor may not sue for compensatory damages
during pendency of the Secrecy Order).
142. Clift v. United States, 635 F.2d 826, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1979); Halpern v. United States,
258 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1958). In Halpern, the court held that a trial in camera in which the
United States cannot invoke the state secrets privilege is permissible under the Inventions
Secrecy Act if, "in the judgment of the district court, such a trial can be carried out without
substantial risk that secret information will be publicly divulged." 258 F.2d at 44.
143. 35 U.S.C. § 183 (1982) granting inventors a right to compensation makes no mention
of either an open or a closed courtroom.
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respected in such circumstances."" Assertion of the privilege might
cause the court to dismiss the plaintiff's claim or to enter a judg-
ment against the defendant. Furthermore, a claim must be dis-
missed if proof requires evidentiary probing at the borders of the
privileged information and thus threatens its confidentiality. 14 5
D. Rights of Former Government Employees
Former government employees who, as a part of their govern-
ment employment, enjoyed access to classified information have no
first amendment right to disclose such materials in writing or oth-
erwise. Moreover, the government may require a former employee
to submit writings relating to his government employment for pre-
publication review for the purpose of deleting classified informa-
tion. The United States may claim profits earned by a former em-
ployee from publishing materials in contravention of a
prepublication review requirement.
In Snepp v. United States,46 Snepp, a former employee of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) published, in contravention of
his employment contract, a book concerning CIA involvement in
South Vietnam. The contract prohibited Snepp from publishing
any information relating to the CIA without its specific prior ap-
proval. Under the contract Snepp also agreed not to disclose classi-
fied information without proper authorization. 14
The United States brought suit seeking a declaration that Snepp
had violated his valid contractual obligations, an injunction requir-
ing that he submit future writings for prepublication review, and
the imposition of a constructive trust for the government's benefit
on the profits Snepp might earn from publishing in violation of his
contractual obligations to the CIA.148 Denying that the first
144. See Farnsworth Cannon v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980). Grimes involved a
suit against an employee of the Department of Navy for wrongful interference with prospec-
tive contractual relations between the plaintiff and United States Navy. The Fourth Circuit,
on rehearing en banc, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the cause of action and held
that any attempt by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case "would so threaten disclos-
ure of state secrets that the overriding interest of the United States and the preservation of
its state secrets precludes any further attempt to pursue this litigation." Id. at 281.
145. Id. at 281.
146. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
147. Id. at 507-08.
148. Id. at 508.
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amendment barred any of the claims against Snepp, the Supreme
Court sustained every government request.
In a per curiam opinion, the Court declared that "[t]he Govern-
ment has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of
information important to our national security and the appearance
of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our for-
eign intelligence service. ' 149 Accordingly, the Court reasoned, even
without an express agreement, the CIA can impose prepublication
review requirements on former employees without disturbing the
first amendment. 150
Trial court findings substantiated that Snepp had frequent ac-
cess to classified information.11 The trial court also found that
flouting a prepublication review agreement could harm vital na-
tional interests whether or not a publication reveals classified in-
formation.1 52 Because the CIA possesses a uniquely broad array of
information that enables detection of material that might expose
classified information or confidential sources, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the absence of prepublication review may occasion
unwitting disclosure of national security information by a less in-
formed former employee.153 It further reasoned that this hazard
could cause foreign intelligence services to cease full cooperation
with the CIA.154 Thus, the Court concluded, Snepp's violation of
his prepublication agreement irreparably harmed the
government. 55
To deter similar future injury to national security interests, the
Court explained, the government was entitled to an injunction
against Snepp and to all profits derived from Snepp's unlawful
publication.'56 It concluded that an award of compensatory or pu-
nitive damages in lieu of profits would not establish a strong mone-
tary deterrent to prepublication review violations because of evi-
dentiary difficulties the government might encounter, including its
149. Id. at 509 n.3.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 511.
152. Id. at 511-12.
153. See id. at 512.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 513.
156. Id. at 514-15.
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legitimate reluctance to offer evidence in open court that might en-
danger national security, yet be pertinent to proof of damages.157
Tacit in the Snepp decision is the conclusion that the first amend-
ment right of persons to receive information 5" is subservient to the
government's need to preserve the confidentiality of classified
information.
The CIA's prepublication review requirements entitle the gov-
ernment to delete only classified information from any submitted
writing or proposed speech. In United States v. Marchetti,59 how-
ever, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that former CIA employees have no constitutional right to ju-
dicial review of the correctness of the secrecy classifications the
CIA uses in deleting information from submitted materials.16 0 The
court explained that classification decisions about one item of in-
formation frequently turn on expert knowledge of a broad spec-
trum of foreign intelligence matters. Thus, "[w]hat may seem triv-
ial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has
a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of in-
formation in its proper context."' 6'e Because courts are novices in
foreign intelligence matters, they are ill-suited to review the pro-
priety of classification decisions. 62
In 1974, after the Marchetti decision, Congress amended the
Freedom of Information Act to authorize judicial review of classifi-
cation decisions when agency records are sought.' Thereafter, in a
sequel to Marchetti, Alfred A. Knopf v. Colby, 64 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that former
CIA employees could obtain judicial review of classification deci-
sions in challenging Agency deletions of materials submitted for
157. Id.
158. See generally Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (holding that recipients of prescription drug price information
enjoy a first amendment right to receive that information); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381
U.S. 301, 305-06 (1965) (holding that citizens have a first amendment right to receive politi-
cal publications sent from abroad).
159. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
160. Id. at 1317.
161. Id. at 1318.
162. Id.
163. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561).
164. 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975).
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prepublication review under the deferential FOIA standards.'65
In the most recent of these lower court decisions, Agee v. CIA,16
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia im-
posed a broad prepublication injunction against a former CIA em-
ployee, Philip Agee, for intentional violations of a prepublication
review agreement. 6 7 The injunction prohibited Agee "from dissem-
inating, or causing to be disseminated, any [written or oral] infor-
mation or material relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, its
activities, or intelligence activities generally, without the express
written consent [of the Agency] .. ."168 The only exception to the
prohibition was for "extemporaneous oral remarks that consist
solely of personal views, opinions, or judgments on matters of pub-
lic concern, and that do not contain, or purport to contain, any
direct or indirect reference to classified intelligence data or
activities .. ."169
E. Access by Congress
The maiden effort by the federal judiciary to resolve a dispute
between the Executive and Congress over access to classified infor-
mation confirms that such clashes raise nonjusticiable political
questions. In United States v. AT&T, °7 0 the Department of Justice
sued AT&T to enjoin it from complying with a subpoena issued by
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The Subcommit-
tee issued the subpoena in furtherance of its investigation into
warrantless wiretapping in the United States, ostensibly for na-
tional security purposes. The Subcommittee suspected abuse of
warrantless wiretapping and was concerned with the possible need
for remedial legislation.17 '
The FBI conducted warrantless wiretaps using AT&T facilities.
Typically, the Bureau would send a "request letter" to AT&T
specifying a target line to be tapped, identified by telephone num-
165. See id. at 1367.
166. 500 F. Supp. 506 (D.D.C. 1980).
167. Id. at 507-10.
168. Id. at 511.
169. Id.
170. 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
171. Id. at 385.
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ber, address, or other numerical designation. The letter would fur-
ther request a private leased line to transmit the tapped communi-
cations to an FBI monitoring station."7 2
The Subcommittee subpoena demanded that AT&T provide
copies of all national security request letters. It also sought compa-
rable records maintained prior to the initiation of the request let-
ter practice.1 73 Prior to the lawsuit, Subcommittee Chairman John
Moss and executive office officials had negotiated about alternative
disclosures that would satisfy the information needs of the Sub-
committee. In lieu of the request letters, the Justice Department
proposed to provide expurgated copies of backup memoranda the
Attorney General used to decide whether to authorize foreign in-
telligence warrantless wiretapes. 174 Such copies would substitute
generic descriptions for information that would identify specific
targets of the wiretapes. 17 5 The Subcommittee agreed to the terms
of the proposal, except for the method of verifying the accuracy of
the generic descriptions. 7 6
The proposal's verification procedures provided that for two
sample years, 1972 and 1975, the Subcommittee would receive all
Attorney General backup memoranda pertinent to domestic na-
tional security surveillances, with minor deletions to shield ongoing
investigations. The foreign intelligence backup memoranda for
those years would be edited to disclose targets only generically. 77
The Subcommittee was to maintain the documents in secrecy as
provided by House Rules. 17 8
To verify the accuracy of the foreign intelligence generic descrip-
172. See id.
173. Id. at 385-86.
174. Id. at 386.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Under pertinent House rules, the documents in question could be released only by
vote of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (the "Subcommittee") of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (the "Committee"), chaired by Con-
gressman Moss. The Subcommittee's vote could be overruled by a majority vote of the Com-
mittee, which, in turn, could be overruled by a majority of the House. Any member of the
House would have been permitted access to the documents in question, but would have
been bound by the House Rules not to release such documents without obtaining the requi-
site vote of the Subcommittee, Committee or House. See id. at 386-87 (referring to House of
Representatives Rule XI(2)(a), (g) and Rule XI(2)(k)(7)).
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tions, White House officials offered Chairman Moss the right to
inspect a subsample of unedited backup memoranda,179 or, alterna-
tively, offered the Subcommittee the right, after proceeding
through certain channels, to obtain the personal review and certifi-
cation of the President. 8 0 The Subcommittee insisted that staff
members cleared for national security trustworthiness have access
to a subsample of unedited backup memoranda, and have a right
to take notes to the Subcommittee."8 l
Disagreement over the verification question provoked Chairman
Moss, on behalf of the House of Representatives, to intervene as a
defendant in the injunction suit against AT&T.18 2 The executive
branch urged that compliance with the Subcommittee subpoena
threatened public disclosure of all foreign intelligence surveillance
targets since 1969.183 That publicity, the executive branch claimed,
would adversely affect diplomatic relations with many countries,
and would jeopardize the collection and utility of intelligence and
counterintelligence information. 8 4 The district court issued the re-
quested injunction, Congressman Moss appealed, and the court of
appeals remanded to foster a settlement.
The court of appeals recognized that the House's demand that
the President provide access to foreign intelligence information
might raise a nonjusticiable political question. 85 In balancing the
investigatory need of Congress against the national security powers
of the executive branch, the court conceded that formulating judi-
cially manageable standards would be problematic. In this case,
the court noted that evaluating Congress' need for the "request
letters" to execute its investigatory power would be difficult be-
cause other information was available from the executive
branch. 186 It further noted that to assess the national security in-
terests of the President, a court would need to address the likeli-
hood of leaks from Congress and the effect of a leak on intelligence
179. Id. at 387.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 388.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 390.
185. Id. at 391.
186. Id.
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activities or diplomatic relations. 87
The court declined to decide the political question issue and a
host of other thorny legal questions, however, and instead en-
couraged a settlement satisfactory to the essential needs of both
Congress and the Executive.'88 Indeed, the court gratuitously in-
jected a suggestion that the parties employ the judiciary in crafting
verification procedures to avoid the procedural disagreement that
earlier had scuttled a settlement. 8" The record was remanded to
the district court, which was ordered to report on the progress of
settlement negotiations. 190
Negotiations failed, and the case returned to the court of ap-
peals.19' After offer and counteroffer, the Subcommittee rejected a
final Executive proffer providing that subcommittee staff could in-
spect all expurgated backup memoranda for two sample years, plus
ten unexpurgated memoranda randomly selected by the Subcom-
mittee. 92 Under the plan, the Attorney General could make substi-
tutions for any unexpurgated memoranda if he believed its disclos-
ure would gravely injure national security or would result in
physical harm to any person.193 The substitutions would be subject
to in camera judicial review, as would the accuracy of the generic
descriptions in the expurgated memoranda. 94 The Subcommittee
objected that the sample size for unexpurgated memoranda was
too small, that the Attorney General's right of substitution further
undermined the validity of the sample, and that the judiciary was
incompetent to review executive decisions over the foreign intelli-
gence matters in dispute.195
Seeking to conciliate the disputants, the court of appeals denied
that abstention under the political question doctrine was required
because judicially discoverable or manageable standards were un-
available to assess Congress' and the Executive's claims over access
187. Id.
188. See id. at 390-92.
189. Id. at 394-95.
190 Id. at 395.
191. United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
192. Id. at 125.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 124-25.
195. Id. at 125.
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to foreign intelligence information.198 In substance, the court held
that the abstention doctrine would apply only if the constitutional
claims of either Congress or the President were clearly and un-
equivocally correct:197 "In our view, neither the traditional political
question doctrine nor any close adaptation thereof is appropriate
where neither of the conflicting political branches has a clear and
unequivocal constitutional title, and it is or may be possible to es-
tablish an effective judicial settlement."1 98
Addressing the case's merits, the court of appeals reasoned that
the respective investigatory and national security interests of Con-
gress and the Executive must be balanced. 199 Daunted by the
profound and prophetic intellectual undertakings needed to per-
form such balancing, the court again refrained from decision. In an
irregular and unorthodox opinion, the court authored a detailed
plan for Subcommittee access to unexpurgated backup memoranda
that it hoped would prove satisfactory.20
The court proposed that the Subcommittee staff randomly select
ten unedited backup memoranda for 1972 and 1975, and compare
these with the corresponding expurgated material.20 1 The staff
would be permitted to take notes regarding the accuracy of both
the classification of the memoranda as relating to foreign intelli-
gence and the use of generic terms, but their notes would be left
under seal at the FBI.20 2 Staff could report their conclusions orally
to the Subcommittee. 20 3 The Subcommittee could seek in camera
196. Id. at 126-27.
197. See id. That conclusion seems bizarre, because in such circumstances judicial resolu-
tion of the constitutional issue would be simple.
The present dispute, in its original stance, raised serious questions as to the
competence of a court to resolve it on the merits .... Our earlier decision to
encourage further negotiation has, we believe, largely obviated this problem by
bringing into sharper focus the needs of the parties....
We do not accept the claims of either the executive or the legislative branch
that its determination of the propriety of its acts is conclusive on the court.
Such claims invite this court to adapt the political question doctrine for the
situation where the political branches are in conflict.
Id.
198. Id. at 127.
199. See id. at 131.
200. See id. at 131-33.
201. Id. at 131.
202. Id. at 131-32.
203. Id. at 132.
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judicial review of a claim of inaccuracy, that if sustained, would
justify some unspecified remedial order by the district court.20 4
The executive branch could substitute an edited backup memoran-
dum for any unedited backup memorandum randomly selected for
Subcommittee staff review by showing in camera both that the ed-
ited version was fair and accurate and that the original memoran-
dum contained exceptionally sensitive national security
information.205
The court's proposal only addressed the present needs of the
Subcommittee. Future needs, the court explained, would turn on
what the verification procedures disclosed. If they revealed cheat-
ing or deceptiveness by the Executive, the court asserted, "our as-
sessment of the relative needs of the parties will naturally be
altered. 206
The court sustained the injunction against AT&T compliance
with the Subcommittee subpoena, at least until its verification pro-
cedures had been employed and had proved inadequate.207 The lit-
igation ultimately was settled largely by acceptance of the court's
verification procedures.0 8
The woolly and temporizing opinion of the court of appeals, nev-
ertheless, confirms that the issue of congressional access to classi-
fied executive documents is a nonjusticiable political question. In
Baker v. Carr,°9 the Supreme Court declared that one prime
earmark of a political question is the absence of judicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving the dispute.210 Con-
frontations between Congress and the Executive over access to
classified information are nonjusticiable because weighing the leg-
islative needs of Congress and calculating the national security in-
terests of the President confound orthodox principled judicial
decisionmaking.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 133.
207. Id.
208. Conversation with Richard Willard, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Divi-
sion, U.S. Department of Justice (December 1984).
209. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
210. Id. at 217. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217 (discussing other earmarks of
political questions.
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A realistic hypothetical will further demonstrate that conflicts
between Congress and the executive branch over classified infor-
mation are nonjusticiable political questions. Suppose a fifteen
member House congressional committee insists on access to classi-
fied information about the development and capabilities of the
MX missile. The purpose of the request, the Chairman discloses, is
to persuade an eighth Member of the Committee to vote for a bill
prohibiting further MX funding by showing the missile's vulnera-
bility to Soviet attack. The classified information is unnecessary,
however, to convince seven other Members to support the bill. Ab-
sent eight affirmative votes, the anti-MX funding bill will "die" in
Committee.
Further suppose that the Senate, in the past six months, has
voted to continue MX funding, and that virtually all political
prognosticators believe that Senate MX support still exists. Thus,
even if the House anti-MX bill is voted out of Committee and ap-
proved by the entire House, the likelihood of Senate concurrence is
nil. Suppose also that the House Committee Chairman maintains
that even if the Senate will defeat an anti-MX House bill, the de-
liberations and discussion stimulated by committee approval of the
bill will be instrumental in his plan to generate future opposition
to MX funding both in the general public and in the Senate.
Under these circumstances, how would a judge develop stan-
dards to evaluate the Committee's need for classified information?
Does the judge insist that Committee Members testify about
whether the information would alter their votes on the bill? Would
not that testimony be uninformative unless the Members first ex-
amined the classified information, and would not that examination
render the case moot? Even if the information were disclosed and
revealed MX vulnerability to Soviet missiles, many other consider-
ations might affect a Member's vote on MX funding, including, for
example, the climate of public opinion or the awarding of MX pro-
curement contracts in the Member's district. Thus, a Member
could not know with certainty whether access to the classified in-
formation would alter his vote on MX.
In addition, how would a judge know whether debate on MX
funding in the House and Senate would create a political climate
in the future favorable to funding termination? The judge could
only speculate on the content of the debates and on their exact
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effects on public or congressional support for MX expenditures.
Elections held while litigation is pending might increase the num-
ber of MX proponents in the House, and thus might weaken the
plaintiffs' contention that access to classified information would
eventuate in congressional curtailment of MX funding.
In conclusion, no judicially discoverable or manageable stan-
dards are readily apparent which assign a weight to congressional
need for classified information. The AT&T litigation bears out this
conclusion, because the District of Columbia Circuit failed to an-
nounce standards by which it might weigh the Subcommittee's
need for the identity of foreign intelligence surveillance targets or
for national security request letters.
Weighing the Executive's interest in withholding from Congress
classified information concerning MX development and capabili-
ties also would defy judicial competence. One pertinent factor a
court could consider would be the risk of "leaks" from Congress.
But how could a judge make such a risk assessment? Would the
court examine the frequency of leaks of confidential information in
the past from particular Members, or from particular Subcommit-
tees, or from particular Committees, or from the staffs of Commit-
tees of Members, or from the House as a whole? How relevant
would these inquiries be if Committee or House membership or
staff had changed since the time of the prior leaks?
Even if a risk assessment of congressional leaks could be judi-
cially made, any risk of leaks would damage the national security
in a judicially immeasurable amount by inhibiting the exchange of
information with foreign countries. As a former Director of the
CIA testified in the Snepp litigation:
We have had very strong complaints from a number of foreign
intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging informa-
tion with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I cannot estimate
to you how many potential sources or liaison arrangements have
never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into
business with us.2"
If a CIA Director cannot ascertain the damage to national security
211. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 512-13.
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ascribable to the risk of improper disclosure of classified informa-
tion, how can an uninformed judge make that determination? In
Marchetti, the Fourth Circuit tacitly recognized that judges are
too i-informed and inexpert to appraise the magnitude of na-
tional security harm that could be occasioned by publicizing classi-
fied information. 12 Such a determination, however, is indispensa-
ble to the rational adjudication of a clash between Congress and
the Executive over access to classified information.
In sum, the judiciary can employ no manageable standards to
assign a weight to the Executive's interest in denying congressional
access to classified materials. The court of appeals in AT&T si-
lently confessed to this fact by failing to delineate standards to
make such an assignment.
Additional considerations reinforce the view that congressional-
executive battles over access to classified information raise nonjus-
ticiable political questions. No individual rights are at stake in
such disputes. Both Congress and the President are armed with
institutional powers of self-defense to prevent overreaching by the
other branch of government. Congress is endowed with authority
to legislate, appropriate monies, and oversee executive action. It
may exercise such authority antagonistic to executive wishes if it
perceives that the Executive is abusing its power to withhold clas-
sified information. The Executive has the power to veto legislation,
administer grant programs, issue procurement contracts, and ap-
point officials to check unwarranted congressional retaliation over
abortive quests for classified information. The rarity of litigation
over the congressional access issue confirms a healthy equilibrium
of power between Congress and the President. Thus, no practical
needs seem to exist for the judiciary to resolve questions over con-
gressional access to classified information.
CONCLUSION
In a message to Congress during the agony of the Civil War,
President Lincoln asked, "Is there, in all republics, this inherent,
and fatal weakness? . . .Must a government, of necessity, be too
strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain
212. Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1318.
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its own existence? '213 Despite modest infirmities, statutory and
constitutional law and experience regarding access to classified in-
formation militates against an affirmative answer.
213. 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 426 (R. Basler ed. 1953)(message to
Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861)(emphasis in original).
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